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This study examines the historical role of the diaspora in Cape Verde’s socioeconomic 
development. It analyzes the prospects and limitations of its diaspora as a transnational 
economic development resource. While it is policy oriented, the study off ers a conceptual 
framework to analyze its diaspora engagement policies and eff orts since 1975. Cape Verde 
has emerged as a success story. The diaspora’s contribution was one of the four essential 
factors behind this relative success: migration and remittances, overseas development 
assistance, large scale public investments, and reasonably sound policies and stewardship 
of public fi nances. Today Cape Verde confronts an adverse set of conditions that hamper 
growth and even threaten to undue development gains since 1975. An externally depen-
dent micro state in the world economy, with exceedingly limited internal capacity to gen-
erate growth and employment, Cape Verde has few viable options in this new phase of 
development. Its biggest and most dynamic sector, tourism, is disconnected from the rest 
of the economy. Foreign aid and emigration opportunities are disappearing. This study 
argues, however, that Cape Verde’s reliance on its diaspora as an economic resource will 
only increase. However, a number of obstacles continue to hamper the country’s ability to 
harness the full potential of its diaspora for development.
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This study examines the prospects and limitations of the diaspora as an 
economic development resource for Cape Verde. The underlying sources of 
the country’s post-independence economic development and growth per-
formance can be reduced to four essential factors, or ingredients: migra-
tion and remittances, overseas development assistance, large scale public 
investments, and reasonably sound policies and stewardship of public 
finances. Cape Verde has emerged as a comparatively successful case of de-
velopment over the last four decades (AfDB 2012a; 2012b).The diaspora’s 
contribution was critical. The country’s robust performance across many 
social and economic indicators resulted in the 2008 decision by the United 
Nations to graduate Cape Verde from the list of Least Developed Country 
(LDC). Today Cape Verde confronts an adverse set of conditions that hamper 
growth and even threaten to undue development gains since 1975. Foreign aid 
and emigration opportunities are disappearing, and the lingering Eurozone 
crisis has exposed its over dependence on Europe for all its trade, tourists 
and foreign investments. Despite its graduation, the micro state remains 
structurally vulnerable and externally dependent. The country must search 
for a new development model and sources of growth. It is in this broader 
development context, and structural weakness of its economy, that the 
economic signifi cance of Cape Verde’s diaspora comes into crisper view. 
Ironically, even as emigration prospects and monetary remittances shrink, 
the country’s large diaspora will become even more important, not less, to 
homeland development in the future. Comprising both permanent and tem-
porary migrants, its diaspora has been a vital economic resource historically. 
The diaspora’s structural role in the economy today remains large, with its 
direct fi nancial fl ows accounting for perhaps 50% of GDP. The open question 
today is whether Cape Verde will be able to devise an eff ective strategy to 
deepen and extend its role in national development. A number of obstacles, 
on both sides, continue to hamper the country’s ability to harness the full 
potential of its diaspora in homeland development.
This is a study on the political economy of diaspora-homeland transna-
tional relations. Emigrants, and the diaspora communities that result from 
migration, are important but overlooked transnational actors. Their prac-
tices and ties involving the homeland can have signifi cant impact, positive 
or negative, on the social, cultural, political, and economic development of 
their country of origin. The study examines the historical role of the diaspo-
ra in Cape Verde’s socioeconomic development, and analyzes the prospects 











































diaspora engagement policies and actions adopted by the homeland since 
1975. At the same time, the study off ers a conceptual framework to analyze 
and assess these diaspora engagement policies. It argues that eff ective mo-
bilization of the full economic contribution of the diaspora requires three 
categories of eff orts: diaspora enabling conditions, diaspora-building, and 
diaspora integration. An analysis of the Cape Verdean case will show that, 
fi rst, the migrant economic transnationalism can positively contribute to 
development and, second, that the diaspora’s potential economic contribu-
tion extends far beyond fi nancial and goods remittances. Harnessing this full 
potential requires a broad range of eff orts that enlarge the scale and modes 
of the diaspora’s participation in homeland development. The diaspora’s 
economic contribution, however, is conditioned by factors and motivations 
on the part of the diaspora itself as well as the homeland. This study focuses 
primarily on the policy and institutional strategies adopted by Cape Verde 
to harness this economic transnationalism. As such, the study focuses on 
only one side of the equation. Sustained research is needed on the factors, 
strategies and conditions that determine the diaspora’s own motivations, 
capacity, practices, and contribution.
The value of Cape Verde’s large diaspora as a development asset must 
be considered in the context of the country’s vulnerabilities and limitations. 
First, Cape Verde is a small island development state, with a micro economy, 
no exploitable mineral resources, poor natural and climatic endowments, 
and thus an exceedingly limited productive base. That is, Cape Verde is a 
small state with few viable options to generate growth and long term de-
velopment. Development constraints and growth bottlenecks abound. Its 
micro size, insularity, limited human and natural endowments have meant 
that the country is structurally vulnerable and externally dependent for 
nearly everything, including 80% or more of its food. Second, historically, 
it has relied on donor aid and emigrant remittances. Both sources of free 
money are vanishing. The country’s graduation from the LDC list resulted in 
losing important sources of non-debt external fi nancing – aid, concessional 
loans, and other grants and preferential treatment available to LDCs. In the 
past, foreign aid and concessional loans fi nanced a large public sector and 
extensive public investments that spurred growth and created jobs. With 
the end of aid, and the unsustainability of debt-led growth, the state can 
no longer play this role. Third, in its new phase of development, the country 
must now rely much more on internal resources and sources of growth and 
jobs creation. Cape Verde’s biggest immediate – and structural – challenge is 
to create jobs and income generating opportunities for the resident popula-












but over 30% for among the young and educated (INE 2015). Aid-fi nanced 
large public sectors and public investments have disappeared. An industrial 
or manufacturing base that can generate the jobs and growth necessary is 
impossible, and the private sector as a whole remains weak and limited in 
its investment capacity. Tourism has been the fastest growing and dynamic 
economic sector, but it is an all-inclusive mass tourism model disconnected 
from the rest of the economy. A high leakage rate undercuts its contribution 
to national income and growth. Aside from diversifying the tourism product, 
the country must diversify the economy by fostering new sectors to spur 
growth and create jobs. Fisheries, agribusiness, creative industries, ICT, and 
international transportation and logistics services have been receiving 
policy attention. Each of these sectors faces severe limitations in terms of 
scale, productivity, fi nancing, human capital, quality, and commercializa-
tion. Moreover, Cape Verde will never be a producer or competitor in any 
of these sectors for global markets. However, it can foster these sectors to 
generate jobs by producing for the domestic market and exporting to niche 
markets, primary among them the diaspora market. Fourth, the post-gradu-
ation exigency to spur growth and diversify the economy will require new 
sources external fi nancing. A debt-led growth strategy is neither possible 
nor long term sustainable. Total public external debt has been rising rapidly, 
reaching an alarming 98% of GDP at the end of 2013 (IMF 2014). En-
couraging foreign direct investment (FDI) is necessarily an integral part of 
the eff ort, but the country’s micro scale and limited non-tourism economy 
make attracting substantial FDI diffi  cult. In nearly all these areas, such as 
foreign investments, tourism development, and economic diversifi cation, 
there is potential to widen and deepen the diaspora’s contribution.
The November 2014 eruption of the volcano on the Island of Fogo was 
a microcosm of the relationship between Cape Verde and its global dias-
pora. Diaspora communities were gripped by the unfolding natural disas-
ter, closely following news reports from back home and calling relatives 
daily. For a country where few families are unaff ected by emigration, the 
alarm and anxiety over the wellbeing of relatives were palpable. Individuals, 
church groups, businesses, students, and civic groups each quickly mobilized 
to raise money, food, clothing and other humanitarian supplies to send for 
disaster relief. This rapid and extensive outpouring of support was evidence 
a relationship between the Cape Verdean diaspora and its homeland that 
is intimate, intense, and cemented by strong emotional and material links. 
The widespread use today of information and communications technolo-
gies, such as social media and low cost telecommunications services, has 











































hand, the volcanic eruption also revealed the limitations and weaknesses 
in this transnational relationship. Lack of organization, poor coordination, 
the absence of any eff ective means of communication and collaboration 
between the diaspora and the homeland, meant that individuals and groups 
were scrambling on their own and working in isolation. Policy and govern-
ment offi  cials were invisible. Hometown associations do not exist, nor um-
brella diaspora organizations, both of which could pool and coordinate ef-
forts. Other types of transnational networks, associations, and collaborative 
arrangements between the diaspora and homeland civil society are non-
existent. Neither the diaspora, the government, nor homeland civil society 
has established a credible framework or mechanism to mobilize emergency 
relief supplies or charitable contributions, let alone promote homeland de-
velopment. These weaknesses are exacerbated by policy and institutional 
failures in the homeland, such as ineffi  cient customs procedures, poor trans-
portation, and administrative fragility that frustrate diaspora contributions 
in the form of donations, investments or tourism.  
Aims of the Study
This study examines the evolution and future prospects of Cape Verde’s 
eff orts to incorporate its diaspora in the country’s development. The study is 
organized as follows. The fi rst section examines Cape Verde’s development 
in the context of economic transnationalism. The section then discusses the 
nature of Cape Verde’s diaspora population, and analyzes its past and present 
economic roles. The second section develops a typology of the modes and 
types of the diaspora’s potential economic contribution. It examines the 
nature of the relationship between Cape Verde and its diaspora, the policy 
and institutional measures adopted by the homeland and, lastly, assesses 
the prospects and limitations for expanding the scope and modes of its par-
ticipation in the country’s new development strategy. 
Since 1975, governmentsin Cape Verde have embraced the diaspora 
in national life. Cape Verde is not alone. National governments in the de-
veloping world, along with the major international development agencies 
and donor countries, have been placing increasing emphasis on mobilizing 
diaspora communities as a resource for economic development in their 
homeland. Countries like Israel, South Korea, India, Mexico, Ireland, and 
China are often cited as successful cases of a diaspora-assisted develop-
ment, whereby their transnational communities actively participate in 












Many African governments and regional agencies, such asthe African Union 
(AU) have been keen to replicate this success (Kamei, 2011). Many advanced 
industrial countries have also been rediscovering their nationals abroad 
(Gamlen, 2005). The relationship between migration and development has 
attracted much scholarly attention. A paradigm shift has occurred such that 
migration is no longer viewed as always harmful to development, but major 
debates rage over its signifi cance and net impact. The surge of interest in mi-
gration and development, especially among donor countries and agencies, 
may certainly refl ect a neoliberal agenda that exaggerates the development 
benefi ts of migration while ignoring global power inequalities, restrictive 
immigration policies, declining aid, and the precarious socioeconomic and 
legal situation of migrant populations (Glick Schiller, 2012; de Haas, 2012; 
Skeldon, 2008). The premise of this study, however, is that Cape Verde’s 
emigrant population has always been, and can continue to be, a develop-
ment resource. That is, this form of economic transnationalism – harnessing 
the economic practices, resources, ties and transactions between the dias-
pora and the homeland – can be utilized as a development tool for the home-
land. With a diaspora estimated to be twice the size of the resident popula-
tion, for Cape Verde, the migration-development nexus is not a novelty or 
neoliberal policy fad. Migration has been the central reality of the country’s 
historical formation and, in good and bad ways, has intimately shaped its 
economic development across the centuries. Cases like Cape Verde, while 
perhaps sui generis or outliers, demonstrate the central role of migration in 
a country’s development, if not its national viability. For a country without 
the domestic productive base and natural resources to feed its own people 
and ensure their welfare, migration has been both as a vital relief valve for 
its people to escape poverty, famine, unemployment, and lack of economic 
opportunities as well as a source remittances in the form of money, goods, 
medicine, food, clothing, and even ideas. However, this economic role of the 
diaspora has been limited largely to fi nancial and goods remittances. The 
diaspora has never been a consumer market for its merchandise exports, a 
source of tourism demand, knowledge and skills transfer, or a political lobby 
advocating support for homeland development.
Given its analytical and explanatory objectives, this study focuses on the 
political economy dimension of homeland-diaspora relations. This is not the 
only, or even most important, dimension. Migrant transnationalism encom-
passes all areas of social life and not just ties and transactions that are purely 
economic. Transnational economic relations and fl ows of people, money, 
goods, and ideas are themselves embedded in larger social practices, rela-











































diaspora’s economic role, diaspora-homeland relations are multifaceted and 
span a broad range of social-cultural, political, religious, economic, and psy-
chological interactions, transactions, and connections. They comprise both 
material and immaterial dimensions and relationships. Even if we narrowly 
focus on the material and economic dimension, we expect immaterial, or 
social and ideational, dimension can also impact development. Social remit-
tances of ideas, knowledge, attitudes, identities, norms and values, or other 
forms of transnational ideational and social interactions, indirectly impact 
development in positive or negative ways. Important as these dimensions of 
diaspora-homeland relations are, even for economic development, they lie 
beyond the immediate purview of this study. In similar vein, there is no sug-
gestion here that Cape Verde’s economic development can be reduced to 
migration and diaspora contribution. Such reductionism would also obscure 
the fact that economic development of small developing countries like 
Cape Verde is embedded in a broader global political economy of power 
relations, hierarchy, inequality, and vestiges of colonialism and neocolo-
nialism. Finally, despite its focus is on political economy, the study brackets 
from direct consideration the politics of diaspora-homeland relations and 
the politics of diaspora mobilization. That is, diaspora mobilization is not a 
politically neutral or partisan free process. The Cape Verdean diaspora is 
also an electoral constituency. This is a source of promise as well as peril, 
and it merits a separate study.
Despite its historical and economic signifi cance, there are only few 
works in English on the Cape Verdean diaspora – loosely defi ned as all Cape 
Verdeans and their descendants living abroad permanently or tempo-
rarily, sharing a common identity and ties to the homeland.1 Most research 
on the Cape Verdean diaspora has focused on issues of transnational iden-
tity and citizenship, social formation, migration patterns, immigrant incor-
poration and other cultural and ethnographic questions (Halter, 1993; Challi-
nor, 2008; Batalha and Carling, 2008; Carling and Akensson, 2009; Marques, 
Santos, and Araújo, 2001). A rare few explicitly examine the dimension of 
political economy (Cardoso, 2009; Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Rocha, Tolen-
tino and Tolentino, 2008). Studies on the Cape Verdean diaspora, therefore, 
face daunting challenges in terms of the scarcity of research and data. Its 
geographical dispersion and historical depth present additional research 
challenges. As discussed below, we do not know the true size of this diaspora, 
1.  This defi nition of diaspora departs from the classic defi nition of diaspora as exiled popu-
lations forcibly expelled from a homeland, and sharing a common identity and attach-













its socioeconomic composition, the depth of sentimental and material con-
nections, the scale of return and circular migration, or the scale and com-
position of diff erent kinds of transnational transactions that take place. The 
problem is especially acute for studies on political economy. We have good, 
albeit incomplete, data on monetary remittances and emigrant deposits 
in homeland banks, but data is either limited or nonexistent for goods re-
mittances, diaspora return visits, diaspora foreign investment, skills and 
knowledge transfer, consumption of homeland products, and other types of 
transnational economic transactions.
The Cape Verdean Diaspora, Transnationalism and 
Development
Broadly defi ned for the purposes of this study, economic transnationalism 
consists of all economically relevant practices, fl ows, and transactions between 
diaspora communities and the homeland. Its most visible and recognizable 
manifestation is the sending of fi nancial remittances. For Cape Verdeans, 
bidons (drums) fi lled with goods sent to family members has become em-
blematic. No other social group or sub-state actor embodies transnationalism 
better than diaspora communities. Since they retain emotional and material 
ties to the homeland, and engage in practices that span or cut across multiple 
borders, migrants and diaspora communities are among the most tangible 
and weighty transnational actors (Portes, 2001). For good or ill, therefore, 
migration has been an intimate aspect of Cape Verde’s social formation and 
development process, and remains one of the few viable options available as 
it transitions into its new phase of development. However, to capitalize fully 
on this potential, the country and its diaspora must move away from the tra-
ditional methodology of relations; new strategies and instruments are needed 
to expand the scope and modes of the diaspora’s participation. Indeed, in light 
of ever restrictive immigration policies in host countries and the long term 
decline of remittances, the new framework must move diaspora-homeland 
relations beyond monetary remittances and bidons. More still, since the dias-
pora’s economic role remains large – and its withdrawal catastrophic – a policy 
priority must be to nurture, expand and manage this role.
Harnessing the diaspora for development compels us to rethink and 
reconceptualize our traditional notions and theories of economic develop-
ment. In the case of a small developing country like Cape Verde, the building 
blocs of economic development have tended to focus on governments, 











































regimes and global markets, and other state-centric actors and interac-
tions. Transnational actors, such as diasporas, are rarely considered as a 
potentially weighty factor – good or bad – in a country’s social, political, and 
economic development. For countries like Cape Verde, economic transna-
tionalism has been central. As this paper argues, it is not possible to un-
derstand Cape Verde’s social and economic formation, before and after in-
dependence, in the absence of economic transnationalism.
A vast literature on transnationalism and migration exists (Levitt, 
DeWind, and Vertovec, 2003; Vertovec, 2003, 2004; Portes, 2001; Faist, 
2009). As such, conceptual and theoretical debates need not detract our 
analytical objectives in this study. Migrant transnationalism is just one of 
several forms of the phenomena of sub-national, non-state, non-institu-
tional actors interacting and transacting across or above multiple national 
borders (Portes, 2001). Transnationalism, and diaspora communities as 
distinct agents and actors in global aff airs, shifts our methodological and 
conceptual focus from the nation-state as the unit of analysis to non-state 
actors and forces transcending sovereign borders. Globalization intensifi es 
these fl ows and practices that cross, span, and transcend borders. Migrants 
occupy a distinct transnational space that encompasses material and imma-
terial facets and transactions. Of great policy and theoretical signifi cance 
of transnationalism is that it can lie, fully or partially, beyond the purview, 
control, regulation or preferences of formal governing structures or agents 
of the state. In the case of the diaspora, some facets of its transnational ac-
tivities may be partially or fully controlled by the state, such as migration, 
remittances, investment, return visits, but other facets lie beyond the state’s 
reach and capacity. A significant portion of monetary remittances, for 
example, fl ow through informal channels. New communications and infor-
mation technologies further strengthen the ability of transnational actors 
and fl ows to escape the purview of states. Transnationalism, moreover, is 
not always a positive force. Not all forms of migrant transnational practices 
benefi t homeland development (Faist, 2009). Transnationalism, including 
migrant transnationalism, can involve illicit traffi  cking, international orga-
nized criminal networks, cybercrime, pandemics, terrorism, and so on. Mi-
grant transnationalism can often entail activities and transactions – such as 
protest, organized opposition, and other anti-system behavior – that threaten 
both the security and prosperity of the homeland state. Viewing it as a 
threat, not all countries wish to involve their diaspora in national life. These 
are not major concerns in the case of Cape Verde. Nonetheless, many people 
express concerns over perceived negative cultural and social infl uences from 












Thus, transnationalism in the context of migration encompasses mul-
tiple and interacting dimensions and spaces (Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec, 
2003). This study focuses exclusively on migration and the political economy 
of homeland-diaspora relations. However, the transnational lives and prac-
tices of migrants cannot be reduced solely or even primarily to economic 
interactions with the homeland. A vast literature examines the cultural, so-
cial, and ideational dimensions of transnationalism and its impact. Given its 
analytical and explanatory objectives, this study isolates the economic as-
pects of transnational migration, specifi cally diaspora-homeland economic 
relations, but no suggestion is made here that this facet is insulated from 
or impervious to the other dimensions. These facets interact and transform 
one another. Indeed, the social, cultural and ideational dimensions of trans-
national interaction between diaspora and homeland, especially as they im-
pact identity formation, may have a determining role in shaping diaspora-
homeland economic relations.
Economic transnationalism has its limits. The diaspora has not been, 
and will not be, the only critical factor is Cape Verde’s development. Migra-
tion has been, and might continue to be, a central reality for Cape Verde, 
but its socioeconomic development cannot be reduced to migration and 
diaspora. Mobilizing the diaspora’s full contribution must necessarily be 
only one component in a much broader national development strategy and 
post-graduation growth model. For any country, especially small developing 
countries, development is conditioned, positively or negatively, by a number 
of factors internal and external to the country. Vital as migration and the di-
aspora’s contribution may be, the development of a small, highly open and 
vulnerable, and externally dependent country like Cape Verde will always be 
conditioned by global forces over which it has no control, including a global 
asymmetries of power, wealth resources, and economic exchange. As such, 
the prospects and limitations of the diaspora’s contribution must be placed 
in this larger context of global relations and local capacity. Notwithstanding 
these larger global constraints and development handicaps, homeland poli-
cies, institutions and conditions remain critical. The Cape Verdean diaspora, 
as discussed below, is an economic diaspora – in that emigration over the 
centuries involved individuals and families driven by poverty  at home and 
searching of better economic opportunities abroad. Put diff erently, caution 
is necessary in analyzing the positive links between migration and develop-
ment for Cape Verde, since migration has been a product of the country’s 
poverty and underdevelopment. In good and bad ways, migration and de-
velopment in Cape Verde are inseparable. The country’s high rate of out mi-











































ate growth and development. In a land of poverty, drought and scant natural 
resources, migration constituted a vital safety valve. The export of people 
reduced the pressures at home for food, jobs, education, and resources. On 
the other hand, migration was also a positive economic resource in terms of 
the monetary and goods remittances that resulted. The small island coun-
try, with a long history of emigration, implicitly has always relied on diaspo-
ra-based economic transnationalism as a major resource.
It is not the purpose of this study to engage in debates about the mi-
gration and development nexus. Others review this debate (Skeldon, 2008; 
Ratha, Mohapratha, and Scheja, 2011; de Haas, 2012; Schiller, 2012; Faist, 
2009; Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Ratha, 2003; Durand, Parrado, and Massey, 
1996). The relationship between migration and development is neither lin-
ear, simple, or unidirectional. As de Haas (2012) notes, it is context depen-
dent. There are limits and challenges to migration’s potential contribution to 
development, many of which are beyond the control of either the homeland 
or its emigrants. Unavoidably, migration has negative and positive impacts 
on the homeland, especially for a country like Cape Verde with a high pro-
portion of emigration consisting of skilled labor. We can assume a high de-
gree of brain drain in the Cape Verde case, but data and empirical research 
are scarce as is data on brain gain and circulation (Cabral, 2009). Migration 
deprives a country of social and human capital essential to productivity, 
creativity and entrepreneurship; it can result in negative social and cultural 
impacts, such as family separation, breakdown, and negative cultural infl u-
ences. There is a widespread view in Cape Verde that emigration results in 
reduced work ethic and entrepreneurship by relatives in the homeland who 
simply rely on remittances from family members abroad. That the diaspora 
retains strong material connections to the homeland may mean more re-
mittances and circular migration, but it also means diaspora-owned houses, 
farmland, and other productive assets frequently remain frozen, unused, 
and an obstacle to local and national development planning. 
Given Cape Verde’s structural characteristics and severe development 
limitations, it is safe to conclude that emigration has resulted in a net posi-
tive impact and that the diaspora’s direct contribution has been vital. Com-
pared to other countries, Cape Verde may be an outlier in that migration 
looms so large in its development, today as in the past. The reason is not 
solely based on the disproportionately large size of its diaspora and high 
rate of out migration, but also based on the sizeable fi nancial role of the di-
aspora in the economy. As discussed below, 40% of Cape Verde’s GDP today 
is accounted for by the direct financial transfers (remittances and emi-












migration in the country’s development is not merely a theoretical exercise. 
Understanding the prospects and limitations of this economic transnationalism, 
and devising an eff ective framework to manage and nurture it, becomes a 
practical, timely and urgent policy necessity.
The paucity of empirical research on the economic impact of migration 
in Cape Verde tempers any fi rm conclusions and net assessments (Bour-
det and Falck, 2006; Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008). Migration has 
contributed positively to Cape Verde’s development at both the macroeco-
nomic and micro, or individual and household, levels. Migration becomes 
a development resource for countries with Cape Verde’s characteristics. To 
put it crudely, Cape Verde has always been a country unable to feed itself, 
let alone possess the scale or productive endowments for large scale eco-
nomic activities to employ everyone. Cape Verde’s historical vocation has 
been the export of people, including skilled labor. As noted above, this has 
not only been an important social and economic pressure relief valve but 
also a source of economic value. Migration results in an infl ow of fi nancial 
resources that can stimulate consumption, production, improve balance 
of payments and the current accounts, increase hard currency reserves, 
and boost private investments. Financial remittances became one of the 
two biggest sources of external financing for the economy during the 
fi rst three decades after independence. The macroeconomic impact of re-
mittances and emigrant deposits extended even further. Such fi nancial in-
fl ows by migrants are non-debt. Combined with the fact that remittances 
are also a stable, non-volatile source of fi nancing, they were pivotal to Cape 
Verde’s macroeconomic stability and long term sustainability. Finally, the ex-
perience of countries like India, China and others, demonstrate how a well-
articulated and managed diaspora engagement framework can transform 
skilled emigration into an important source of growth and innovation for 
the homeland economy. At the micro level, the positive impact of migra-
tion is visible, both in terms of remittances as well as circular migration 
and social remittances of skills, ideas, knowledge, entrepreneurship. Re-
mittances have been critical sustaining household consumption, reducing 
poverty and even stimulating entrepreneurial activities. Since those early 
years, the remittance by emigrants to relatives of money, food, clothing, 
medicine, home goods, tools, farm equipment, vehicles, machinery, and 
other goods made the diff erence between famine and survival, abject 












































The Cape Verdean Diaspora and the Role of Migration  
The Cape Verdean diaspora is unique. On both theoretical and policy 
grounds, Cape Verde off ers a novel and fertile case study on migration and 
homeland development. Cape Verde is notable among countries with large 
emigrant populations because of the relative size of the diaspora, the his-
torical depth of its formation, and the unusually strong bond the diaspora 
maintains with the homeland. Cape Verde has the largest diaspora popu-
lation in Africa, relative to the resident population, and ranks among the 
largest in the world (Ratha, et. al., 2011). Cape Verde and emigration 
are synonymous. Transnationalism thus defi nes Cape Verde and the Cape 
Verdean experience in the modern world. Indeed, as a vulnerable micro 
state in the world economy with near total dependency on the outside, Cape 
Verde’s development and national survival have been determined by the 
external dimension – trade, migration, remittances, donor aid. 
Migration is thus at the heart of Cape Verde’s historical formation as a 
society and economy (Batalha and Carling, 2008; Halters, 1993). The history 
of Cape Verde is a history of migration. Its formation as a society has roots 
in migration – from the brutality of colonial “discovery” and the violence of 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade, to centuries of voluntary out migration driven 
by famine and poverty. Cape Verde is unique among countries of the global 
South because its transnational and transatlantic migration, both coercive 
and voluntary, began so early (Halters, 1993). This economic transnationalism, in 
eff ect, started with the country’s social formation and origins as an entrepôt 
during the Atlantic slave trade. In its non-coercive manifestation it has been 
reproduced across centuries of out migration driven by poverty, famine, 
colonial repression, and lack of economic opportunities. The indelible traces of 
transnationalism are visible as early as the nineteenth century when the so-
called packet boats and whaling ships transported people, goods, money 
and ideas back and forth between the Islands and the Americas. The Cape 
Verdean diaspora is also unique because, despite its long history, it retains 
strong sentimental and material ties to the homeland even after becoming 
permanently settled in host countries. With a large diaspora relative to its 
tiny resident population, few families in Cape Verde are unaffected by mi-
gration. Cape Verde continues to have one of the highest rates of emigration 
in the world (Ratha, et. al., 2011).
Cape Verde, perhaps more than any other country, can be considered 
a nation, a culture and society whose history and identity are intimately 
shaped by and through its diaspora and history of emigration (Challinor, 












Blacks in the United States. Ship manifests and other offi  cial records show 
Cape Verdean emigrants in the United States by the mid-1700s (Halters, 
1993). In general, prior to independence in 1975, there were three great 
waves of outmigration (OIM, 2010a, p.26). The fi rst big wave of outmigra-
tion from the Portuguese colony, approximately 1900-1926, was destined 
primarily toward the United States (although arrivals had begun over a cen-
tury earlier). The second wave, 1927-1945, was oriented primarily toward 
Latin America and Africa, while the third wave during 1945-1973 went to 
Europe. In general, the Cape Verdean diaspora communities in Europe are 
more recent and comprise a much higher percentage of temporary migrants 
(Batalha and Carling, 2008). Most offi  cial fi gures indicate that the majority 
of emigrants from Cape Verde in the last two decades went to Europe. Thus, 
Cape Verde’s diaspora does not consist only or primarily of temporary mi-
grants, but also long established, permanent communities with a high level 
of social and economic integration in their host countries. Its diaspora is 
quite varied in terms of history, geography, genealogy, and socioeconomic 
composition. That is, while it is a large global diaspora, Cape Verdean com-
munities abroad are heterogeneous in terms of socioeconomic conditions, 
legal status, host country incorporation, wealth resources, and overall levels 
of human development. On the other hand, it is a culturally, linguistically, 
and ethnically homogeneous diaspora, and reinforces the transnational 
identity of the people as one nation.
No one knows the true size of Cape Verde’s diaspora. Census data in 
the US or Europe are nonexistent. Is is likely that Cape Verde has the largest 
Diaspora in the world relative to the resident population. A widely shared 
assumption is that the Cape Verdean diaspora is ‘twice the size’ of the 
resident population of roughly 500,000. The largest diaspora commu-
nities are in the United States and Europe, primarily Portugal, France, 
the Netherlands (Holland), Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland and more 
recently Spain. Scatterings of Cape Verdean emigrants can be found in 
nearly every part of the world, from nearby Senegal and São Tome e Prín-
cipe, to Argentina and Brazil to China. The United Nations database on 
international migration estimates a total stock of 171,737 Cape Verdean 
emigrants in 2013 (UN-DESA, 2014), or 35% of the resident population. 
The Global Migrant Origin Database of the Development Research Cen-
ter (DRC) places the estimate at 199,644 in 2007 (DRC, 2014). The Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates 
116,248 Cape Verdeans living and working in OECD countries in 2011 
(OECD, 2011). The World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration databank cal-











































population.2 A now extinct government agency responsible for emigrant 
support services had estimated a diaspora population size of 518,180 in 
1998 (OIM, 2009, p.18). An early World Bank report in 1985 estimated a high 
range of 454,00 compared to 296,000 residents (World Bank, 1985a). A re-
cent study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2010b, p.9) 
puts the size of Cape Verde’s emigrant population at 450,000, or 90% of the 
resident population. Even if we use a low conservative estimate, it still would 
represent a signifi cant stock relative to the tiny resident population. Based 
on the UN migration data, Cape Verde’s diaspora size relative to national 
population is much higher than comparative fi gures for Senegal (4%), Libe-
ria (8%), Ghana (3%), and Côte d’Ivoire (4%).3 Cape Verde’s relative diaspora 
size is more comparable to high emigration countries like El Salvador, whose 
total emigrant stock is roughly 24% of the resident population.
Evolution of the Diaspora’s Economic Role
There is strong empirical and historical reason to assert that Cape Verde’s 
economic viability and social progress since 1975 would have been improba-
ble without its diaspora’s contribution. This study argues that in order for the 
diaspora to remain a valuable economic resource in the next phase of Cape 
Verde’s development, a new framework must be devised that expands the 
modes of its contribution. The diaspora’s historical contribution has been 
largely limited to goods and monetary remittances, as this section discusses 
below. Today, the economic value of Cape Verde’s diaspora is neither limited 
to, nor primarily, in the form of fi nancial remittances. Yet Cape Verde and its 
diaspora have yet to develop a framework to mobilize the full extent and 
modes of the diaspora’s contribution. However, this does not imply absence 
of substantial contribution today and in the past. Financial remittances re-
main important today. Since 1975, the diaspora’s primary contribution has 
been channeled through monetary remittances, but today it is also emerging 
as an important source of investments.
 
2.    Note that the methodology and defi nition used by many international agencies tend to rely 
on offi  cial census data as well as defi ne migrants as only foreign born, non-citizen individu-
als residing in a diff erent country. As such, this methodology would severely undercount 
the Cape Verdean diaspora, especially older and rooted communities in the United States.












Figure 1. Cape Verde Migrant Remittances4 
Universally, remittances are the most visible and direct manifestation of 
the diaspora’s contribution to homeland development. Offi  cially recorded 
remittance infl ows from Cape Verde’s diaspora in 2013 totaled $13.7 billion 
escudos, or roughly $172 million dollars (BCV, 2014b). Remittances were 
three times the size of foreign aid, and bigger than donor aid and FDI com-
bined. Remittances are two to three times bigger than merchandise export 
earnings. In fact, it is safe to say that the export of workers (emigration) is 
Cape Verde’s single biggest export. As percentage of GDP and in per capita 
terms, Cape Verde is among the highest recipient countries in the world. 
Cape Verde was the 6th largest remittances recipient in Sub-Saharan Africa 
in 2013, as percentage of GDP, and 29th in the world, according to World 
Bank data (World Bank, 2014). In per capita terms, Cape Verde remittance 
infl ows in 2013 infused an additional $352 dollars into the personal income 
of every resident, more than double the minimum monthly salary. This per 
capita contribution of remittances ranks Cape Verde among the highest re-
cipient countries in the world such as El Salvador ($664), Guatemala ($349), 
the Philippines ($258) and Nepal ($187).5 Cape Verde’s remittanceper capita 
is the highest in the West Africa subregion, with Senegal ($116) trailing a 
distant second. Historically until the mid-1990s, remittances and foreign 
aid have been the dominant infl ows, accounting for as high as 80% of the 
4.    World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), 2014.








































































































country’s GDP (World Bank, 1985b, 6). For most the decade and half after 
independence, remittances ranged between 40% and 25% of GDP. The 
World Bank estimates that remittances accounted for over 40% of GDP 
during 1978-82 (World Bank, 1985a, p.29).As is commonly observed, offi  -
cial statistics on monetary remittances underreport their actual size. An un-
known but presumably signifi cant portion, as high as 50% of offi  cial fi gures, 
is transferred through informal channels (Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 
2008). Likewise, offi  cial data do not capture non-monetary remittances, or 
goods remittances. Goods remittances have been just as equally important 
as monetary remittances, especially in terms of their role in household con-
sumption and poverty alleviation. 
Today, offi  cially recorded remittances account for roughly 9% of Cape 
Verde’s GDP, which is much lower than in the past (BCV, 2014a). However, 
this fi gure is far above the regional average of 2.6 percent for Sub-Saha-
ran Africa (Ratha, Mohapratha and Scheja, 2011). Remittances have been 
steadily rising in absolute terms for more than two decades. Despite its de-
clining share in GDP, remittances remain one of the four main sources of 
fi nancial infl ows into Cape Verde today, along with ODA, FDI, and tourism 
travel receipts. During the 2005-2011 period, remittances averaged 10.3% 
share of GDP. Tourism receipts have averaged 18.7 percent of GDP during 
2005-2011, ranging between 12-21 percent.6 For its part, FDI averaged 10 
percent of GDP during this period, oscillating between 6.3 to 14.2 percent 
of GDP. In the last few years since the 2008 crisis, remittances have been 
a bigger source of external fi nancing than FDI – indeed the largest source 
not including tourism receipts. Remittances infl ows in 2009 experienced an 
expected but almost negligible dip, 1.6%, in contrast to the -36.5 decline 
in FDI. Infl ows of approved FDI resumed in 2010, but took another steep 
drop, 21.6%, in 2011.7 Remittance infl ows rebounded, to a peak of 28% in 
2011. Importantly, unlike FDI and ODA, remittances are not only stable but 
also non-seasonal. In terms of the economic geography of remittances, 
Cape Verde enjoys signifi cant remittance infl ows from eleven countries, the 
majority of them in the European Union. Over the last three decades or so, 
the top source countries for roughly 80% of Cape Verde’s remittances have 
been Portugal, France, Netherlands, and the United States. Italy has been 
a distant fi fth for most years, followed by Switzerland, Luxembourg, and 
increasingly Spain and the United Kingdom. Portugal, traditionally home 
to the largest Cape Verdean migrant worker community, has remained the 
largest single source country (Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008).That 
6.    Author’s calculations based on BCV normalized balance of payments data.












the European based diaspora, comprising a higher proportion of temporary 
migrants, remits more than the historically older US diaspora is not sur-
prising. Research has shown that temporary migrants tend to remit much 
more and more frequently.
 
Figure 2. Trends in Main Sources of External Financing, GDP Shares8 
In summary, monetary remittances continue to be a crucial source of 
development fi nancing and poverty alleviation for Cape Verde. They have 
proven resilient and stable, confi rming research fi ndings that remittances 
are more stable and counter-cyclical. The overall relative decline of remit-
tances in GDP may primarily refl ect the fast growth of the homeland economy 
in the past two decades, rather than restrictive immigration policies or genera-
tional turnover. Undoubtedly, however, the latter two phenomena are 
occurring. 
Even as remittances decline, Cape Verde has been making good progress in 
expanding the modes of diaspora contribution. The most important change 
in the diaspora’s role has been its rise as a source of foreign investments. 
Cape Verde’s diaspora is depositing its savings in specially designated “emi-
grant accounts” in homeland banks. The origins of these emigrant deposits 
date to a 1984 law, revised and amended in late 1995. The accounts can 
be in local or foreign currency time deposits. They are tax-free and carry high 
interest rates. In addition, emigrants may borrow up to twice their value. Emi-
grant deposits are conceptually and qualitatively diff erent from remittances. 
8.   Author’s calculations compiled from various offi  cial reports by the Banco de Cabo Verde, 
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They are investments, as emigrants pursue higher rates of return on their 
money. More than three times the size of annual remittance infl ows, by the 
end of calendar year 2013, Cape Verde’s emigrants had deposited over $545 
million dollars in Cape Verde’s commercial banks (BCV, 2014b). As alluded to 
previously, emigrant deposits and offi  cially reported fi nancial remittances 
combined account for about 40% of Cape Verde’s GDP. This share is likely 
much higher since some portion of remittances is informal and emigrant 
investments are included in FDI fi gures.
 
Figure 3. Financing Cape Verde’s Economy - Main Sources 20139
 
Emigrant deposits are by far the largest single category of deposits in 
the national banking system. Fruit of a policy innovation in the mid-1990s, 
emigrant deposits now constitute a substantial portion of assets in national 
banks. Representing nearly 30% of GDP, emigrant deposits also account for 
over 32.4% of M2, or monetary mass. Like remittances, emigrant deposits 
have proven very stable, even during the crisis years following 2008. Indeed, 
this stable and steady growth, without any reversals, is characteristic of emi-
grant deposits since 1991 (BCV, 2012). Emigrant deposits also represent46% 
of the outstanding commercial credit to the economy during the fourth 
quarter of 2013 (BCV, 2014b). This external fi nancing has helped fuelled the 
country’s growth by supporting domestic investment and business develop-
ment. As such, emigrant deposits have been a signifi cant source of liquidity 

























for the banking system, which has converted these assets into investment 
credit. Diaspora savings, in other words, have been supporting the credit 
expansion that has benefi tted business and consumers alike. The substantial 
amount of emigrant deposits is not risk free, since sudden withdrawal can 
cripple the banking system and trigger economic ruin. Growth and stability 
in the deposits have been the norm, even after the 2008 global and Euro-
zone crises. For now, emigrant deposits constitute a diaspora vote of confi -
dence in the homeland. The country’s stable and predictable exchange rate, 
based on a fi xed peg with the euro, provides added confi dence.
Finally, observational evidence suggests two other notable trends. The 
fi rst is a growing trend of ‘transnational entrepreneurship’, as emigrants 
start or fi nance businesses in the homeland or launch new ventures that ca-
ter to this transnationalism (Portes, Guarnizo and Haller, 2002). The second 
trend, often intertwined with the fi rst, is that emigrants themselves are 
using their savings to finance their own housing construction, other 
property investments, and entrepreneurial ventures. The last two decades 
have witnessed a veritable boom in emigrant home construction and real es-
tate purchases by emigrants. Aside from depositing their savings in home-
land banks, emigrants are also investing in real estate, farmland, transpor-
tation, hotels, and new business ventures. Reliable statistics on emigrant 
foreign direct investment are lacking. Reports of the Central Bank of Cape 
Verde (BCV) over the last few years have inserted a new rubric labeled “emi-
grant investments,” but there is no consistency in reporting, explanation, or 
systematic treatment.10 In one of its random reporting, BCV data indicates 
that emigrant investments accounted for 42% and 28% of total FDI in 2012 
and 2013 respectively (BCV 2014b, 25).
Lastly, observational evidence suggests that potential exists to extend 
the diaspora’s contribution in other modes. Based on current trends and 
market signals, two areas of biggest potential are tourism demand and so-
called “nostalgic” trade. Not only is there already a detectable amount of 
informal transnational trade taking place between Cape Verde and its dias-
pora, but circular migration is also substantial. Signifi cant deepening of di-
aspora participation in either or both of these areas, trade and tourism, can 
have signifi cant multiplier and secondary eff ects on homeland economic 
growth, diversifi cation of the economy, business development, rural pover-
ty alleviation and jobs creation. The strong emotional and material bonds 
10.  Care is necessary in treating statistical data from all sources. It should be noted that there is 
frequent discrepancy and inconsistency across diff erent statistical reports from the Banco 
de Cabo Verde (BCV) or in diff erent editions of the same reports. Some data is always 











































between the homeland and its diaspora mean that Cape Verdeans are re-
turning and visiting in substantial numbers. A growing trend is emigrants 
returning to retire. Most return to vacation and participate in annual cultural 
festivals. The diaspora is consuming the few ‘made in Cape Verde’ products 
available on store shelves in community supermarkets and shops in the US 
and Europe. In other words, a ready-made consumer market exists for Cape 
Verdean exporters. The biggest consumption item has always been cultural 
products, music especially, but there is high demand for other goods, espe-
cially agro-foods and traditional alcoholic beverages. 
Notwithstanding these many positive developments, Cape Verde and its 
diaspora have failed to extend the scale and modes of diaspora contribution 
beyond the areas above. Progress in transforming the diaspora into a source 
of foreign investment has been notable, but the diaspora is still not a source 
of tourism demand or consumer market for national products. Nor is the di-
aspora a meaningful source of knowledge and skills transfer. As noted above, 
emigrant direct investment and transnational entrepreneurship appear to 
be substantial and gaining momentum, but there is neither reliable statisti-
cal monitoring of it or a policy framework to guide it. Philanthropy and charity 
are widespread but ad hoc. Despite a good deal of enthusiasm and eff orts 
among diaspora individuals and groups to send donations and other chari-
table contributions, no credible framework exists to marshal, coordinate, 
manage and catalyze  such eff orts. The inability to harness the full potential 
contribution of the diaspora is puzzling because of the unusually strong and 
positive ties between the diaspora and the homeland. Diaspora-homeland 
and diaspora-state relations have always been positive, rather than hostile, 
historically. What explains this incomplete success in harnessing the dias-
pora as a development resource? As noted previously, there are numerous 
facets to this questions, and a complete explanation would have to examine 
the many social, political, economic, cultural and ideational factors inside 
the diaspora itself. The importance of these other factors notwithstanding, 
diaspora engagement policies of the homeland are also determining in the 
success and failure of diaspora mobilization. The section below develops a 
typology of diaspora engagement policies and mechanisms, and assesses 
Cape Verde’s policy performance in each of the categories. 
Harnessing the Diaspora for Development
Cape Verde today is in a development crossroads. Having graduated into 












to fi nd new sources of growth and innovation. Given the size and historical 
signifi cance of its diaspora, and limited in its options, Cape Verde is rethinking 
ways to leverage its diaspora as a resource. Since independence, Cape Verde 
has sought to incorporate its diaspora in all facets of national life. Only re-
cently has this goal taken a more focused and comprehensive form, but it 
builds on years of individual policies and laws aimed at encouraging greater 
diaspora participation in all aspects of national life. The 2014 National Strategy 
on Emigration and Development (ENED) outlines a general framework and 
goals. The document is aware of the need to mobilize the diaspora along 
multiple forms, or modes, of participation. It identifi es four broad areas: pro-
moting dialogue and information sharing; increasing remittances, including 
charitable contributions and philanthropy; skills remittances; and invest-
ment and trade promotion. The importance of the diaspora is also cited in 
other key development documents like the Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (GPRS) and the Plan of Government. As noted below, 
however, these documents remain largely aspirational, having generic goals 
and lacking an operational or implementation plan for diaspora mobiliza-
tion. Nonetheless, there is a durable political will and broad partisan support 
in the homeland to embrace the diaspora.
Largely implicitly, and without a comprehensive strategy, migration has 
always been an integral part of Cape Verde’s development strategy since 
1975. Strong emotional and material bonds retained by emigrants materi-
alized as monetary and goods remittances, requiring little eff ort in policy 
or institutional innovation on the part of the homeland. Today, for all the 
reasons discussed in this study, the laissez-faire approach of the past is no 
longer relevant. Migration must be translated into positive economic con-
tributions through deliberate and sustained eff orts by the homeland and 
its diaspora. Diaspora engagement policies are one crucial component of 
this process of translating migration into a development resource. In both 
policy and the academic literature, the focus has concentrated on fi nancial 
remittances, skills transfer, remittance capture and immigration policies 
(Bhagwati, 2003). This is a narrow conception of the possible economic roles 
of the diaspora, since today its role as tourists, investors or consumers of 
nostalgic goods will have far greater growth-inducing impact. To leverage 
fully its diaspora, Cape Verde must go beyond monetary remittances to 
harness the diaspora as a source of growth, jobs creation, innovation and 
global economic integration. Although a number of policy and institutional 
defi cits stand in the way, as discussed below, Cape Verde has good reasons 
to believe its diaspora can continue its historically signifi cant economic role 











































institutional supports on multiple fronts. These policy and institutional sup-
ports fall into three distinct but mutually reinforcing analytical categories: 
diaspora enabling, diaspora-building, and diaspora integration.
The section below off ers a typology of diaspora engagement policies. 
It is important to re-emphasize that, while this study focuses primarily on 
the eff orts of the homeland state, constructing an eff ective and sustainable 
framework is a two-way street, and it must involve both governmental, non-
-government, civil society and private sector actors on both sides. More-
over, as De Haas (2012) and others have observed, the laws and policies of 
diaspora host countries – on immigration, banking and money transfers, so-
cial security, taxation, mobility and guest workers, circular migration – have 
considerable impact on the scale and modes of the diaspora’s contribution 
to the homeland. Even with a fully developed diaspora engagement frame-
work, the homeland may not be able to derive migration’s full contribution if 
the policies of host countries areincompatible. Nevertheless, homeland poli-
cyis crucially important. The experience of other countries, and the practical 
necessities of development planning, suggest that the homeland state can 
play a pivotal role: devising appropriate policy and institutional mechanisms, 
creating an enabling environment, but also an equally important role as fa-
cilitator and promoter of bottom-up transnational initiatives by the diaspora 
and homeland civil society. Lastly, as Portes (2001) has observed, harness-
ing the full potential contribution of a diaspora does not require the active 
participation of every member of the diaspora, only a portion. It does not 
require substantial circular movement or even conscious eff ort by diaspora 
individuals or groups to structure or direct their activities as contributions 
to development. Activists, grassroots groups, transnational entrepreneurs 
and other similar groups and individuals are important, but passive and oc-
casional consumers of homeland exports can be equally signifi cant from the 
standpoint of development. As noted previously, the socioeconomic profi le 
of the Cape Verdean diaspora is heterogeneous, comprising established 
middle and professional classes as well as low skilled temporary migrants 
and marginal communities. Moreover, not everyone has to contribute in the 
exact same extent or frequency. Considerable variation is to be expected in 
the intensity, scope, frequency and modes of participation. The bulk of the 
diaspora’s contribution occurs through individual actions and decisions – re-
mittances are a great example – but incrementally and cumulatively they 
can have major economic impact and the micro and macroeconomic levels 
(Vertovec, 2004; Levitt, 2001).This is all the more reason that it is critical to 
devise a diaspora engagement framework that fosters diff erent levels and 












strategic framework lies precisely in its capacity to mobilize and facilitate di-
aspora participation across a broad range of modes: as investors, knowledge 
remitters, consumers of homeland exports, tourists, and so on.
Typology of Diaspora Engagement Policies
In terms of its direct economic participation in homeland development, 
the diaspora’s potential contribution spans a broad range of activities, 
modes, and roles. It can be direct and visible as well as indirect and not easily 
quantifi able. Contribution is used here in a wider meaning rather than nar-
rowly to mean direct giving, as in remittances, donations, or voluntarism. 
Important as monetary remittances are, it is more appropriate to view the 
diaspora’s potential contribution in terms of the multiple modes of participa-
tion. As such, a framework constructed to harness the diaspora as an eco-
nomic resource must be able to do so across all the possible modes of con-
tribution. The experience of countries like Israel, South Korea and, recently, 
Ireland, China and India, illustrate that the diaspora’s contribution can ex-
tend across multiple modes. This experience has drawn much scholarly atten-
tion to what Patterson (2006) has called “diaspora-homeland collaborative 
development.” The scope and number of these modes will diff er from coun-
try to country and will depend, in part, on the three categories of diaspora 
engagement eff orts. Not all modes may be possible at once, nor materialize 
in the same depth. For Cape Verde’s political economy profi le, we can iden-
tify several possible modes.
The possible economic roles of Cape Verde’s diaspora can be divided into 
fi ve or six distinct categories, or modes: a source of monetary remittances; 
a source of direct investment; a consumer market for homeland or nostalgic 
exports; a tourist demand market; and as a source of brain gain. The sixth 
mode, while not strictly economic in character, can be consequential for de-
velopment – namely, the diaspora as a transnational political lobby. A po-
litically well-organized diaspora can be an eff ective advocate and promoter 
of homeland development by lobbying and pressuring host governments 
and international donor agencies. The case of Israel may be sui generis. No 
suggestion is made that Cape Verde’s diaspora is similar in size, wealth or 
organizational capacity. A major handicap Cape Verde and its diaspora con-
front is the low levels of organization and political mobilization inside dias-
pora communities. The diaspora is poorly organized. It can neither defend 
nor advocate for its own community interests and welfare, let alone advo-











































and manage its own contribution to homeland development, as the recent 
volcanic eruption illustrated. This internal weakness obstructs the diaspora’s 
full potential irrespective of the eff orts of the homeland. Finally, the list of 
modes above is not exhaustive. There are several other potential modes not 
mentioned. Diaspora transnational entrepreneurship, a variant of direct in-
vestment, can be a transformative force in the both the homeland and host 
countries (Portes, Guarnizo and Haller, 2002). As diaspora reaction to the 
volcanic eruption illustrates, for example, the diaspora can be an important 
source of charity and humanitarian relief. Similarly, another potential is phi-
lanthropy oriented toward community development, youth empowerment, 
education and training, and entrepreneurship, including microfi nancing, 
scholarships, and project grants. The eff ectiveness of diaspora hometown 
associations in the cases of El Salvador and Mexico illustrates not just the 
potential impact of diasporas on community development but also the 
importance of diaspora organization (Durand, Parrado and Massey, 1996; 
Landolt, 2001; Portes, Escobar and Radford, 2007). New information and 
communication technologies open up a range of unexplored opportunities 
for virtual diaspora engagement, especially in knowledge and skills transfer. 
This study examines the types of diaspora engagement policies neces-
sary to harness these various modes and expand the scale of each type of 
contribution. Like the diaspora’s modes of participation, diaspora engage-
ment policies and mechanisms vary widely. A universal formula or set of 
policies does not exist. Gamen (2006) suggests we can classify diaspora 
engagement policies into general types of policies homeland governments 
pursue, namely, policies oriented toward diaspora capacity building, ex-
tending rights, and extracting obligations. Brinkerhoff  (2012) and others ar-
gue that eff orts to harness the diaspora for development are eff ective only 
if broader conditions in the homeland are conducive. For analytical conve-
nience, and borrowing from Brinkerhoff  (2012) and Gamlen (2010), we can 
organize these policies and conditions into three distinct categories, or ty-
pologies: diaspora enablers, diaspora-building, and diaspora integration. 
The three categories are interrelated and mutually supporting. Success in 
harnessing the diaspora’s full potential requires substantive progress in all 
three categories of diaspora engagement policies.
Diaspora Enabling Conditions
Diaspora enabling conditions comprise all macro level social, economic, 












facilitate the participation of diaspora members in national life of the home 
country. These conditions include among them: the nature of diaspora-
homeland relations, especially the character of the diaspora exit; social and 
political stability; macroeconomic conditions; and governancequality in the 
homeland. In other words, enabling conditions and policies are not directly 
related to, or aimed, at the diaspora, but encompass the general socioeco-
nomic and political conditions in the homeland. These conditions impact the 
lives, behavior and economic activities of everyone – residents, diaspora, 
foreign investors, tourists, donors. By shaping the wider structure of incen-
tives, risk, and productivity, enabling conditions spur growth by facilitating 
economic activity, entrepreneurship, trade, investment, and business develop-
ment.11 While gaps and challenges remain, Cape Verde enjoys a number of 
enabling conditions that favor diaspora engagement. 
Of the three categories, Cape Verde has made most progress in the area 
of enabling conditions. First, diaspora-homeland relations have always been 
positive historically. It is not a relationship characterized by mutual hostility, 
fear, or rejection. The diaspora is not an exiled population forcibly removed 
or fl ed persecution. Migration has been free of exit trauma. Poverty and 
famine have been the main drivers, not civil wars, ethnic cleansing, persecu-
tion, or expulsion. Aside from the exuberance and competitiveness of parti-
san politics, the Cape Verde case is free of anti-system behavior, deep social, 
ethnic or political cleavages, political exclusion or trauma. Government-
-diaspora relations are equally positive. Partisan squabbles and criticisms of 
government policies are routine but normal. 
Second, political stability, social peace and durable institutions have 
been crucial enablers of the country’s underlying economic and political suc-
cess since independence. Problems remain. Comparatively, however, the 
country has performed well. It ranks high in Africa and the world in terms 
of democracy, governance, transparency, and human development (AfDB, 
2012a).Aside from a competitive multiparty democracy, there is rule of law, 
secure property rights, and investor protection. 
Third, good governance and sound macroeconomic management have 
been the country’s trademark, and ensured its credibility with donors, foreign 
investors, and diaspora alike. Over the last two decades, Cape Verde has 
pursued economic and trade liberalization as well as reforms to improve 
11.  For a comprehensive analysis of economic conditions and the business climate in Cape 
Verde, see: Government of Cabo Verde, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Cape Verde: 
Constraints to Growth, Transformation and Poverty Alleviation (Praia: MFP, 2010); and 
Government of Cabo Verde, Ministry of Tourism, Industry and Energy (MTIE), Cape Verde: 












































the business and investment climate, including reforms to improve the effi  -
ciency of public administration to deliver services to citizens and businesses. 
The reforms, still incomplete, have been improving the business and invest-
ment climate for all investors – nationals, foreigners as well as diaspora. For 
example, one important reform has been in electronic government, and the 
creation of a one-stop-shop platform, the Casa do Cidadão (House of the 
Citizen) which allows nationals and emigrants to access common services 
virtually or in person at any consulate. Progress is uneven and big challenges 
remain, especially in the areas of public administration effi  ciency, customs 
procedures, business and investment regulations, and regulatory environ-
ment. Even though institutions generally work, favoritism, judicial delays, 
and bureaucratic ineffi  ciencies are common. The two biggest areas of dias-
pora complaints in Cape Verde are transportation and customs administra-
tion. Diaspora visitors and returning emigrants overlook the inadequacies 
of health care, water, electricity and other services, but the low quality and 
ineffi  ciencies of international and inter-island transportation as well as cus-
toms administration generate a level of frustration that dampens diaspora 
enthusiasm for the homeland. Today, growing external debt is threaten-
ing macroeconomic stability. Social inequality, crime and public insecurity, 
weak accountability of elected offi  cials, policy dysfunctions, and other ills 
still exist, and may threaten long term stability and democratic governance. 
Despite these challenges, Cape Verde possesses a still durable and favorable 
enabling environment for eff ective diaspora engagement.
Diaspora Building Policies
Diaspora building, in essence, entails constructing a shared identity and 
common purpose that can be harnessed for homeland development. There 
is nothing automatic in collective identity formation, and translating identi-
fy into collective action. This is especially true of the Cape Verdean diaspora, 
which is dispersed geographically and spans generations. Diaspora building 
policies are measures and initiatives aimed at constructing solidarity, shared 
identity, common purpose, patriotism, and strengthening emotional bonds 
with the homeland and inside the diaspora. They involve the construction 
of a transnational imagined community. They also include activities that 
constitute and recognize diaspora communities (Gamlen, 2010). In so-
cial science jargon, diaspora building entails symbolic as well as concrete 
actions involving transnational nation-building. Although this study focuses 












necessarily depends much more on the diaspora’s own internal eff orts, con-
ditions and dynamics. As noted, the diaspora’s motivations, incentives, and 
mobilizational capacity are critical determining factors (Vertovec, 2003).
Diaspora building eff orts can be subdivided into fi ve subcategories, 
namely, cultural affi  rmation, community support and consular services, di-
aspora organization, circular migration, and diaspora focused administrative 
structures. Cultural affi  rmation eff orts by the diaspora and the homeland 
are oriented toward fostering collective identity, cultural pride, solidarity, 
and transnationalism nationalism.  Commonly used diaspora building ini-
tiatives by homelands include promoting cultural festivals, sponsoring and 
facilitating national day celebrations, community outreach, diaspora return 
festivals, among others. The Cape Verdean diaspora is also unusual in the 
strength and vitality of its collective identity and cultural affi  rmation. Dias-
pora communities retain cultural practices and customs, turning their local 
communities into little ‘Cape Verdes’ in host countries. Cultural, ethnic, re-
ligious, and linguistic homogeneity further strengthens this transnational 
collective identity and sense of nationhood. The use of the native language, 
creolu, is a powerful cement and dimension of collective identity that uni-
fi es diaspora Cape Verdeans irrespective of their geographic residency. The 
homeland government has typically not focused on cultural affi  rmation ac-
tivities. Some of its policies, such as refusal to recognize creolu as an offi  cial 
language, undermine cultural affi  rmation. Community outreach is also an 
important element. Frequent offi  cial visit to diaspora communities by govern-
ment leaders is a common practice, even though they are social orpartisan 
events rather than development promotion.
Homeland governments have been attentive to providing consular ser-
vices to diaspora communities, including a focus on providing social and 
financial assistance to distressed communities. Cape Verde’s principal 
diplomatic representations are precisely in the countries with substantial 
Cape Verdean immigrants. The advent of electronic government, specifi cal-
ly the one-stop-shop Casa do Cidadão, off ers greater reach and effi  ciency in 
providing consular services. In a pattern established since the 1980s, much 
homeland policy attention continues to be on social work, focused on pro-
viding social services and integration assistance to diaspora communities. 
The recently endorsed III GPRSP (2012-2016) allocates fi nancial resources 
under the “Global Nation” category, but these are destined for “improving 
the quality of life of emigrants” and reinforcing consular and diplomatic 
representation in the main diaspora host countries.
Diaspora organization and circular migration are two areas in which 











































are practically non-existing. First, the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United 
States and in Europe is poorly organized, as noted above. Notwithstanding 
a proliferation of small neighborhood and church based groups and social 
clubs, intermediary organizations and umbrella associations do not exist. A 
separate study is necessary to untangle the myriad of social, economic, po-
litical, cultural, and even psychological factors that shape and condition the 
diaspora’s weak organization (Vertovec, 2003). Island groupings and home-
town associations are few; if they function at all, activities are primarily social 
and rarely inclusive. The Cape Verdean Associations in many urban centers 
in the Boston-Providence corridor function as a community resource center, 
off ering language classes, translation services, and meeting point. However, 
a peak organization, umbrella association or network of organization does 
not exist in neither the US or in Europe. Diaspora professional networks and 
associations do not exist. Despite its long history in the United States, the 
Cape Verdean diaspora does not have a national umbrella organization – 
not even at the state or municipal levels – that can lobby, represent, defend 
and advocate for its interests. Organizational fragmentation and low levels 
of political participation are the norm. The diaspora in the US is character-
ized by low levels of voter registration and electoral participation despite its 
large size in certain urban centers. 
Various governments have made ad hoc and limited eff orts to en-
courage circular migration and return visits. However, a comprehensive 
policy does not exist, especially policies that either focus on promoting 
diaspora building through return visits and ‘rediscovering ancestral roots’ 
or that focus on promoting diaspora investment and brain gain. Circular 
migration is valuable both in strengthening or renewing diaspora bonds, 
especially with younger generations, and in encouraging economic invest-
ments. Ad hoc and limited eff orts have been tried, including attempts to 
encourage brain gain. With fi nancial support from various European Union 
countries, the government initiated a “Diaspora Contribution” and “Dias-
pora Cape Verde” programs to support short term visits by diaspora pro-
fessionals based in Europe to off er training programs in public and private 
sector organizations. Currently, Cape Verde participates in the Temporary 
Return of Qualified Nationals program, financed by the International Or-
ganization for Migration (IOM). The substantive impact of these one-time, 
two to three weeks training programs is uncertain. Sporadic, individual 
eff orts by businesses, ministries, universities and other agencies to attract 
temporary or permanent return by skilled diaspora professionals are com-
mon. Nevertheless, a specifi c policy to encourage, organize and support 












Cape Verde has performed much better in terms of creating dedicated 
bureaucratic structures to manage diaspora-homeland relations. First, since 
the early years, the government has experimented with an assortment of 
institutional arrangements, although none had the specifi c mandate to mo-
bilizing the diaspora for development. An early mechanism was the creation 
of a directorate general for emigration and consular services in the foreign 
ministry, followed a few years later in 1984 with the creation of the Institute 
for Emigrant Support (IAPE – Instituto de Apoio ao Emigrante). This insti-
tute was renamed the Institute of Communities (Instituto das Comunidades) 
in 2001, also inside in the foreign ministry. These early structures, however, 
were not focused on diaspora economic mobilization. Rather, much of their 
mandate focused on social and consular services. A more recent institutional 
innovation is the creation of “focal points” for migration in all 22 municipali-
ties. In 2008, a separate ministry, the Ministry of Communities, was created. 
In practice, three separate government bodies – the Ministry of Communi-
ties, the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, and the Institute of Communities – are 
responsible for diaspora aff airs. As such, confl icting and imprecise man-
dates, together with institutional fragmentation, is the norm. A national di-
aspora council exists, under the aegis of the Ministry of Communities, but 
it is not clear how operational it is and it functions as a consultative rather 
than policy making body. Notwithstanding the elevation of the diaspora as a 
policy priority, the strategic objective of diaspora mobilization for homeland 
development is neither at the core of policy nor institutional mandate. 
There is one fi nal aspect of diaspora building that merits attention. As 
noted, Cape Verde has not performed well in encouraging circular migra-
tion, but it has made limited progress in enhancing emigration opportunities 
for its people. Namely, it has been active on the diplomatic front in an eff ort 
to widen emigration opportunities through special mobility and temporary 
workers’ accords with European Union countries. It signed a mobility agree-
ment with the EU in 2008, involving the Netherlands, Portugal, France, 
Spain, and Luxembourg. Finally, Cape Verde enjoys preferential access to 
the world’s two biggest economic blocs, the United States and the Euro-
pean Union. While this preferential access is underutilized by Cape Verde 
and other African countries, they give Cape Verde easy access to its diaspora 
communities as well as the wider market in these countries. 
Diaspora Integration Policies











































material connections to the homeland, including cultivating direct diaspora 
participation in all spheres of national life.12 Two important subcategories 
of diaspora integration measures include the extension of constitutional 
rights, such as dual citizenship, and specifi c policies aimed at attracting di-
aspora participation in development. Cape Verde has been an innovator in 
both areas, although institutional and policy defi cits continue to hamper its 
ability to harness fully its diaspora.
Asa matter of constitutional principle, the country has embraced the 
principle of political and legal equality for all Cape Verdeans irrespective of 
their residence or place of birth. Granting automatic dual citizenship and the 
right to vote to its diaspora sets Cape Verde apart from most other countries 
with large diaspora populations. This constitutional principle has a practical 
consequence beyond the importance of patriotism and emotional bonds – it 
facilitates circular migration. Second, and related to this constitutional prin-
ciple, universal suff rage was extended to the diaspora in national elections. 
Cape Verde’s diaspora is one of the few in the world able to vote in national 
elections. Suff rage is limited to parliamentary elections, rather than munici-
pal elections. The diaspora is represented in parliament by deputies directly 
chosen by the diaspora constituency. There is uncertainty in terms of taxa-
tion and social rights, such as pensions and social security, although Cape 
Verde has attempted agreements with some European countries.
However, diaspora integration, such as extending suff rage rights, can be 
a dual edge sword. It too is not risk free. There is an ever present risk that 
diaspora-homeland relations will become politicized and infused with parti-
san divisions. As an electoral constituency, the diaspora becomes a domes-
tic political actor. It can infl uence political and electoral outcomes – as it did 
in the controversial 2006 presidential elections – or become embroiled in 
domestic squabbles. Harnessing and mobilizing the diaspora for its de-
velopment contributions in an intimately political endeavor, not a technical 
or bureaucratic process. The process can easily become partisan or engen-
der acrimony and suspicions between the diaspora and the homeland 
government, thus undermining the overall national objective. 
In terms of standalone policies, Cape Verde has made a lot of progress. 
As discussed above, Cape Verde has been one of the largest recipients of 
fi nancial remittances in the world. Remittances are driven by personal and 
familial motivations rather than primarily by policy. However, policy matters 
directly and indirectly to the extent that remittance infl ows are aff ected by 
12.  A useful reference on Cape Verde’s diaspora policies and institutions is the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), Linking Emigrant Communities for More Development: 












monetary and exchange rate policies, macroeconomic governance, and 
general enabling conditions in the homeland. Moving beyond monetary 
remittances, Cape Verdehas embraced policy innovations that have proven 
quite successful. The most outstanding policy success has been the 1984 law 
creating the emigrant deposit bank accounts. That policy alone has been 
responsible for infusing half a billion dollars into the economy. In addition, 
a number of fi scal and other incentives are in place aimed at fostering dias-
pora investment and circular migration. To encourage emigrants to return, 
the country has a number of customs exemptions. As noted, a noticeable 
trend is retired permanent emigrants returning, with their pensions. Returning 
emigrants can ship their belongings, including vehicles and household du-
rable goods, duty free. To encourage emigrants to invest in real estate, for 
example, fi scal and administration fees are waived or reduced. In addition, 
emigrants are also eligible for any of the investment incentives in place that 
benefi t foreign investors, including sector specifi c investments in tourism 
and renewable energy.
Progress and partial success notwithstanding, Cape Verde still lacks a 
coherent diaspora policy, or strategy. Its diaspora ‘policies’ are disjointed. As 
Gamlen (2006) observed, for most countries, diaspora engagement policies 
tend to emerge in ad hoc fashion, unplanned, driven by disparate interests 
and motivations, for diff erent reasons at diff erent times. Cape Verde is no 
exception. In order to harness the diaspora in the post-graduation phase of 
development, a qualitative leap in policy formulation, policy coordination and 
implementation capacity will be necessary. Serious policy and institutional 
defi cits must be addressed. There are three distinct aspects to this policy 
defi cit – policy mainstreaming, bureaucratic capacity, and policy coordina-
tion and implementation. Streamlining and integrating diaspora policy in all 
areas and phases of development planning has never been practiced in Cape 
Verde. Rather than mainstream diaspora mobilization across all policy making 
and institutions, diaspora policy has been scattered and pigeonholed in bu-
reaucratic silos. As a policy issue area, the diaspora is cross-cutting and mul-
tidisciplinary. Diaspora mobilization implicates active involvement of mul-
tiple agencies. It entails active roles from a mix of public and private sector 
agencies covering fi nance, investment and trade promotion, customs, mar-
keting, economic diplomacy, banking services, tourism, transportation, and 
so on. Put diff erently, diaspora mobilization policies must be mainstreamed 
in overall development planning and project implementation.
For the diaspora to participate across all modes of potential contribution, 
all policy and institutional supports must be aligned. For example, obser-











































market for the country’s merchandise and tourism products. However, 
tourism and trade policies have simply ignored the diaspora market despite 
having a diaspora potentially twice the size of the resident population. The 
2010 Tourism Strategic Plan, the fi rst of its kind and subsequently shelved, 
does not even mention the word diaspora. Despite the fact that the dias-
pora is doing tourism in the homeland in large numbers, there is no eff ort to 
court them, cater to them, or treat them as tourists. No eff ort has ever been 
made to market and sell the country’s tourism to its diaspora. In both poli-
cy practice and the theoretical literature, diaspora visitors are not counted 
as tourists, thus Cape Verde not unusual is disregarding this market. It is a 
missed opportunity. Diaspora visitors go in large numbers, especially for the 
big national festivals and cultural celebrations. Even if they choose to stay 
in family homes rather than the all-inclusive hotels, diaspora visitors spend 
more money, stay longer and leave more in local communities through their 
general vacation spending and gift giving to relatives and friends. For good 
or ill, tourism is a critical sector. In the short term, Cape Verde faces a dual 
challenge of increasing the national income eff ects of tourism by diversify-
ing the product, and increasing its linkages to the rest of the economy. The 
diaspora as a tourism demand market can be a signifi cant component of the 
wider diversifi cation strategy.
Similarly, in trade and investment policies the diaspora is missing. A ma-
jor development bottleneck in Cape Verde is its small and geographically 
fragmented domestic market. Incorporating the diaspora population would 
potentially double the size of the ‘domestic’ market, and thus alleviate the 
bottleneck of economies of scale. Despite the apparent avidity with which 
diaspora consumers seek out nostalgicproducts, trade policy has never tar-
geted this export market. Absence of a diaspora trade policy is glaring in light 
of the fact the country enjoys preferential access to the world’s two richest 
markets and home to its largest diaspora communities. It has a Special Part-
nership Agreement with the European for its exports, and duty free access 
to the US market under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). As 
in tourism, there is urgent need to diversify the primary sectors in order to 
address unemployment and rural poverty. Duty free access and high dias-
pora demand can serve as the base for transforming certain agribusiness 
product chains where the country has demonstrated some potential, such 
as wine and traditional alcoholic beverages, goat cheese, fresh, canned and 
frozen fi sh, dried and processed fruits, traditional spices and sauces, and 
coff ee. To be sure, a diaspora export strategy will not be easy. Cape Verdean 
producers face daunting supply side constraints, such as production limita-












management and nonexistent national certifi cation. That is, a diaspora ex-
port strategy will require interventions along the entire product chain, from 
production, to commercialization to market entry requirements. Finally, as 
noted previously, a diaspora trade policy can also engender a number of 
secondary eff ects that boost growth and business development.
Despite increasing reliance on FDI, investment promotion policy does 
not include any explicit diaspora investor targeting, or creative schemes 
such as diaspora public-private partnerships. Several decades of heavy 
public investments in economic infrastructure, in addition to government 
procurement policy and privatization, never attempted to incorporate par-
ticipation of diaspora investors and businesses. Cape Verde sustained nearly 
four decades of heavy public investments in infrastructure. Yet no eff ort was 
ever made to target diaspora investors and diaspora-owned businesses (or 
even domestic fi rms) to participate or bid on projects, nearly all of which 
went to foreign companies. Four decades of missed opportunities in diaspo-
ra-homeland economic relations. The recently launched “Technology Park,” 
data center and other ICT initiatives do not have any explicit plan to incor-
porate or mobilize the knowledge diaspora. Diaspora investment promo-
tion does not require special or preferential treatment, although some coun-
tries adopt such measures. However, it does require investor targeting, with 
dedicated public and private sector agencies that promote, inform, market, 
and encourage a specifi c kind of investment or type of investor. In general, 
investment promotion has been a defi cient component in overall develop-
ment planning. 
Finally, policy coordination and implementation capacity, and the overall 
human and technical defi cits of public institutions, are perennial challenges 
in Cape Verde in nearly all policy areas. As noted, given the absence of policy 
mainstreaming, coordination among the various agencies and ministries 
is nonexistent. Given the multidisciplinary, crosscutting nature of diaspora 
mobilization, policy coordination and implementation capacity are critical. 
Bureaucratic weakness and confl icting mandates aggravate the problem. 
Municipal governments – the point of closest contact with diaspora – are 
limited in resources and capacity. Diaspora focused national bureaucracies 
have their own organizational and human resources limitations. The result is 
they are small, understaff ed, and under-resourced. Project implementation 
and monitoring are perennial diffi  culties in Cape Verde’s public administra-
tion. For example, the ENED contains useful ideas and recommendations, 












































Cape Verde today is in a development crossroads. Having graduated 
from the category of LDC, it must now devise a new model of growth and 
development that relies primarily on internal resources. As in the past, the 
country’s diaspora, as a transnational economic resource, can continue to be 
one of the vital components of the new model. Notwithstanding declining 
emigration opportunities and generational turnover, the diaspora remains 
a viable policy option. As noted, the country’s structural characteristics 
leave it with few other realistic options to spur growth and development in 
the present world economy. Yet it is the positive reasons – a large diaspora 
intensely devoted to the homeland, a declining but still signifi cant role of 
remittances, numerous policy and institutional innovations in the areas of 
diaspora enablers, diaspora building, and diaspora integration – that make 
the diaspora both a viable and signifi cant option. Harnessing the diaspora’s 
participation across all possible modes of contribution to homeland develop-
ment has been one of the biggest policy challenges for homeland govern-
ments everywhere. A number of countries, such as China, India, Israel, South 
Korea, and Mexico, have made progress expanding the scale and modes 
of diaspora contribution. Cape Verde too has made some progress, as the 
phenomenon of emigrant deposits illustrates. Other policies, such as 
extending voting rights and dual citizenship, have proven eff ective instru-
ments to deepen the diaspora’s integration. A qualitative leap is required, 
however. A more eff ective policy and institutional framework is necessary 
as is a better organized diaspora.
While this study argued that the diaspora will only increase in importance 
as a development resource, it is necessarily only one component in the wider 
national development strategy that must fi nd new sources of growth and 
human development. The diaspora can only be one part of a broader de-
velopment strategy. The diaspora is not, and cannot be, the answer to all 
foreign investment needs of the country. Nor can it ever be the sole or even 
primary demand market for the country’s tourism and merchandise exports. 
The diaspora is not panacea. Diaspora mobilization is not risk free, as noted 
previously. As alluded, some of the diaspora integration and diaspora building 
policies – emigrant deposits, extending suff rage – also engender certain 
risks, such as exposureof the fi nancial system and divisive partisanship. 
Harnessing the full potential contribution of the diaspora is not easy, even 
under the best of conditions. The diaspora’s potential as a development resource 
must not be exaggerated or oversimplifi ed. This study identifi ed a number of 












– diaspora enabling, diaspora building and diaspora integration. Multiple 
policy and institutional obstacles in the homeland hamper the diaspora’s 
full contribution. As a structurally vulnerable micro state in the world 
economy, policy has always a pivotal ingredient underlying Cape Verde’s so-
cioeconomic performance since 1975. The country’s enabling environment 
has been critical for development as well as the diaspora’s engagement. 
These enabling conditions are increasingly under strain today. Aside from 
these policy and institutional weaknesses, there are also practical reasons 
that will limit the diaspora’s full contribution to national development. These 
limits, by and large, refl ect the diaspora’s own internal fragilities. Signifi cant 
portions of Cape Verde’s diaspora in the United States and Europe are on 
the social, political and economic margins of those societies, and struggle 
with unemployment, legal status, inadequate housing, crime and youth de-
linquency, family breakdown, inadequate health care and social insurance, 
and many other challenges typical in immigrant communities everywhere. 
As this study argued, one of the biggest obstacle will be the diaspora’s own 
lack of internal organization. 
A fully articulated strategy, requiring sustained eff orts by both the home-
land and the diaspora, will not emerge overnight. A universal formula, or 
recipe, does not exist. However, Cape Verde is not starting from scratch. It 
can build on a number of policy and institutional innovations and an 
enabling environment. Two essential fi rst steps, however, are necessary. 
The fi rst is the need to build up institutional capacity and commit to dias-
pora policy mainstreaming. The second involves actions, symbolic and con-
crete, to promote better internal organization of diaspora communities. As 
noted, diaspora mobilization is a two-way street. The diaspora’s full contri-
bution is crucially dependent on its own ability to mobilize and respond. This 
requires eff ective internal organization. As evidenced in the analysis above, 
Cape Verde has made substantial progress mobilizing its diaspora as a vital 
economic development resource. Economic transnationalism, in the form 
of its diaspora communities, has always been a vital economic resource. 
However, Cape Verde and its diaspora today must reconfi gure their relation-
ship to enlarge the scope and modes of diaspora contribution to homeland 
development.  
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